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Abstract: Innovative services like mobile payments are potentially transformative 
because they can increase access to financial services, especially in developing 
countries. However, such innovations can disrupt the financial services ecosystem which 
prompts regulators to respond in different ways. These regulatory responses often have 
a significant impact on the take-off of such innovative services. Using Nigeria's regulatory 
approach as a case study, this article highlights specific lessons which should inform 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dormont-Naert identifies basic financial services to include access to a bank account, payment services, credit, 
insurance and protection against over-indebtedness.1 Where persons cannot access these financial services, they 
are said to be financially excluded. In many developing countries, financial exclusion is a problem. Banks 
traditionally provide services through branch networks often situated in profitable urban areas.2  However, a 
significant populace resides in rural areas where poverty rates are high. For economic reasons, establishing bank 
branches and Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) to cover rural areas is expensive.3  Hence, many rural dwellers 
have either no access or limited access to bank services.  
The implication is that financially excluded persons cannot save or access credit and, thus, cannot insure 
themselves against unexpected economic shocks like illness or unemployment.4 Hence, such consumers remain 
vulnerable in circumstances that exacerbate poverty.5 Consequently, financial inclusion, which denotes the 
provision of basic financial services to excluded and underserved persons at affordable costs, increasingly feature 
as a development priority.6  Many financial services regimes now include matters about “financial inclusion, 
equity or accessibility of regimes” as core policy considerations7 functioning alongside their core responsibilities 
 
*  Lecturer, School of Law, Birmingham City University, UK.  
1 F Domont-Naert “The right to basic financial services: opening the discussion” (2000) CLJ 63, 67-9 cited in P Cartwright “The vulnerable 
consumer of financial services: law, policy and regulation” 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/businesscentres/gcbfi/documents/researchreports/paper78.pdf   at 39. 
2 E Gibson, F Lupo-Pasini, RP Buckley “Regulating digital financial services agents in developing countries to promoted financial inclusion” 
(2015) Sing. J. Legal Stud. 26 at 26   
3 C Alexandre, I Mas & D Radcliffe “Regulating new banking models to bring financial services to all” (2011) 54(3) Challenge, 116 at 117 
4 RP Buckley, J Greenacre, L Malady “The regulation of mobile money in Malawi’ (2015) 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 435 at 440. 
5 Cartwright above at note 1 at 37. 
6 E Lee “Financial inclusion: a challenge to the new paradigm of financial technology, regulatory technology and anti-money laundering law” 
(2017) 6 JBL 473 at 473; RP Buckley, DW Arner, M Panton “Financial innovation in east Asia” (2014) 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 307 at 347. This 
policy focus is reflected in key documents emanating from international policy standard setting bodies. See, for instance, Global Partnership 
for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), “Global standard-setting bodies and financial inclusion for the poor” (2011) 
https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/White-Paper-Global-Standard-Setting-Bodies-Oct-2011.pdf ; GPFI, “Global standard-setting 
bodies and financial inclusion: the evolving landscape” (2016) https://www.gpfi.org/publications/global-standard-setting-bodies-and-
financial-inclusion-evolving-landscape; The G-20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/G20%20Principles%20for%20Innovative%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-
%20AFI%20brochure.pdf   
7 R Bollen “A Discussion of Best Practice in the Regulation of Payment Services: Part 2” (2010) 25/9 JIBLR 429 at 432. 
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of promoting financial stability, integrity and protecting consumers.8 This is informed by the belief that in the 
absence of intervention, the financial services sector is unlikely to serve persons who are underprivileged due to 
disability, poverty and geographic disadvantage.9  
Technological innovations that present opportunities for expanding access to financial services have 
boosted financial inclusion agendas. These innovations cover a range of activities like offering credit, processing 
payments, issuing currencies and managing assets, to name a few.10 One such innovation is mobile payments (m-
payments).11 Belonging to a bouquet of mobile-based financial services, m-payments cover payment transactions 
in which a mobile device is used to initiate, authorize and confirm an exchange of financial value.12  
M-payments have generated attention in the financial inclusion discourse for several reasons. First, 
statistics show that the number of mobile phones in circulation exceeds any other technical device that could be 
used to market, sell, or deliver products and services to consumers.13 In many developing countries, there has been 
a direct implementation of mobile infrastructures rather than a progression from landline to mobile technology 
which has facilitated the growth in mobile phone ownership.14 Being ubiquitous, mobile phones present a practical 
and cost-effective channel for extending financial services to unbanked persons.15 Moreover, in these countries, 
the adoption of mobile-based financial services has been accelerated by the need to address infrastructure gaps 
which arise when mobile penetration is high, but physical banking infrastructure is deficient.16  
Second, certain success stories lend credence to m-payments’ potential in driving financial inclusion. 
Particularly, Kenya’s success with its m-payment product ‘m-pesa’ remains a reference point in this regard. 
Introduced in 2007, m-pesa is a low-cost SMS-based person-to-person money transfer platform which supports 
the deposit, transfer and withdrawal of funds using mobile phones.17  Since its introduction, m-pesa has assisted 
in improving access to payment services in Kenya. Total account ownership18 in Kenya grew from 42 per cent in 
2011 to 81 per cent in 2018.19 More adults have mobile money accounts (72.9 per cent) in comparison to accounts 
with traditional institutions (55.7 per cent).20  
 
8 These are collectively described as I-SIP objectives: O Tomilova & M Valenzuela “Financial inclusion + stability, integrity, and protection 
(I-SIP): Policy making for an inclusive financial system” (2018) https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/publications/Toolkit-ISIP-Nov-
2018_1.pdf at 1-2 
9 Bollen n 7 at 432; Other considerations drive financial inclusion policies. E.g., regulatory interest in financial inclusion may be fuelled by 
the concern that a country's financial integrity objectives will be undermined if a large percentage of transactions occur outside the scope of 
the regulated formal financial sector. L De Koker “Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, Combatting of Financing of Terror and Financial 
Inclusion” (2011) 18/4 JFC 361 at 363. 
10 R Van Loo “Making innovation more competitive: the case of fintech” (2018) 65 UCLA L. Rev. 232 at 238. 
11 In some literature, broader terms like “branchless banking” are used to describe m-payments. see G Ivatury & I Mas “The early experience 
with branchless banking” (2008) https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/CGAP-Focus-Note-The-Early-Experience-
with-Branchless-Banking-Apr-2008.pdf   
12 YA. Au, RJ Kauffman ‘The economics of mobile payments: understanding stakeholder issues for an emerging financial technology 
application” (2007) 7 Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 141 at141.   
13 T Dahlberg, N Mallat, J Ondrus, A Zmijewska “Past, present and future of mobile payments research: a literature review” (2008) 7 ECRA 
165 at 165. 
14 S Rosenberg “Better than cash? global proliferation of payment cards and consumer protection policy” (2006) 60 Consumer FinLQ Rep, 
426 at 437 cited in A Angelovska-Wilson, J Fetault "M-payments: the next payments frontier - current developments and challenges in the 
international implementation of m-payments" (2007) JIBLR 575 at 585. 
15 JK Winn, L De Koker “Introduction to mobile money in developing countries: Financial inclusion and financial integrity” (2013) 8/3 
Wash.JLT & A 155 at 162. 
16 F Arner, W Douglas, J Barberis, RP Buckey “FinTech, regtech, and the reconceptualization of financial regulation” (2017) 37 Nw. J. Int'l 
L. & Bus. 371 at 380. 
17 MW Buku, MW Meredith, “Safaricom and m-pesa in Kenya: financial inclusion and financial integrity” (2013) 8 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 
375 at 378;    
18 The World Bank defines account ownership to include accounts held at a financial institution and those held with a mobile money provider. 
Available at: < https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/sites/globalfindex/files/chapters/2017%20Findex%20full%20report_chapter1.pdf> (last 
accessed 14 March 2020) 
19 The World Bank "The little data book on financial inclusion" available at: 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29654/LDB-FinInclusion2018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>  (last 
accessed 14 March 2020) at 84. 
20 Ibid.   
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M-pesa’s success has inspired regulators prioritising financial inclusion. In 2009, two years after m-pesa’s 
launch, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) designed a regulatory framework for m-payment services in Nigeria.21 
Despite this effort, Nigeria has failed to replicate m-pesa’s success. Reflecting on Nigeria’s approach to regulating 
m-payments, this article aims to highlight specific regulatory lessons which can inform future attempts at 
regulating m-payments. To this end, this article is structured as follows: Following this introduction, the next part 
of the article will review key aspects of the regulatory framework for m-payments in Nigeria. Building on this, 
the article then highlights specific lessons that can be extracted from Nigeria’s regulatory experience. The next 
section puts forward alternative considerations that should inform the regulation of m-payments before concluding 
the discussion.   
 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE PAYMENTS IN NIGERIA 
In 2010, 46.3 per cent of Nigerian adults were financially excluded.22 With such numbers, it was unsurprising that 
in 2011, CBN committed to reducing exclusion under the “Maya Declaration” spearheaded by the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion at its Global Policy Forum in Mexico.23 The Maya Declaration represents “the first global 
commitment by policymakers from developing and emerging countries to unlock the economic and social 
potential of the poor through greater financial inclusion”.24 In line with its commitments under the declaration, 
CBN launched a National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) in 2012.25 A principal goal identified in the NFIS 
was to increase access to payment services from 21.6 per cent in 2010 to 70 per cent in 2020.26 To achieve this, 
CBN identified m-payments as one of the key drivers in meeting its target.27 M-payments were singled out because 
of the high mobile penetration rates at the time.28 The article divides the key aspects of CBN's regulatory response 
into two phases discussed below. 
 
Phase I: 2009 – 2014  
This phase reflects initial attempts at regulating m-payments primarily through the introduction of a licensing 
regime. Before releasing the NFIS, CBN issued key regulatory documents applying to m-payments. First, in 2009, 
it released a document entitled “The Regulatory Framework for Mobile Payments in Nigeria” (‘the 
Framework’).29 In 2014, it released a second document entitled “Guidelines on Mobile Payment Services in 
Nigeria” (‘the Guidelines’) which updated the Framework.30  
The Guidelines outline the three objectives informing CBN’s intervention. First, the intervention aimed to 
‘ensure a structured and orderly development of mobile payment services in Nigeria, with clear definition of 
various participants and their expected roles and responsibilities.’31 Second, it aimed to specify the minimum 
 
21CBN “Regulatory framework for mobile payment services” (2009) available at: 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/OUT/CIRCULARS/BOD/2009/REGULATORY%20FRAMEWORK%20%20FOR%20MOBILE%20PAYMEN
TS%20SERVICES%20IN%20NIGERIA.PDF (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
22 CBN “National financial inclusion strategy” (2012) available at: <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2013/CCD/NFIS.pdf> (last accessed 14 
March 2020). 
23 Available at: <https://www.afi-global.org/maya-declaration>  (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
24 CBN National Financial Inclusion Strategy, above at note 22 at 23. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Id at vi, 1, 29. 
27 CBN National financial inclusion strategy, above at note 22 at ix, 24, 34, 45. 
28 Id at 12. 
29 Ibid. 
30CBN "Guidelines on mobile money services in Nigeria" available at 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2015/bpsd/guidelines%20on%20mobile%20money%20services%20in%20nigeria.pdf> (last accessed 14 
March 2020). 
31 CBN Guidelines on mobile money services, above at note 30 at paragraph 3.0(a).   
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technical and business requirements for the various participants in the recognized m-payments industry. Third, it 
sought to promote the safety and effectiveness of m-payments services to enhance user confidence.32 
Under the Guidelines, only licensed entities designated as ‘mobile money operators’ (MMOs) may provide 
m-payment services.33 The Guidelines permit two business models which MMOs can adopt in providing the 
service. These models are described as the bank-led model and the non-bank led model.34  The Bank-led model 
represents one in which the service provider is a bank either alone or in a consortium with other banks. In this 
model, banks may choose to partner with other approved organizations but remain principally responsible for 
delivering the service.35 In the non-bank model, a corporate organization, other than a bank, may be licensed to 
deliver m-payments. While not defining which organisations qualify to lead a non-bank model, the Guidelines 
expressly exclude mobile network operators (MNOs) from the model’s scope.36  CBN justified this exclusion on 
the basis that MNOs would pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. This is because MNOs lack the 
experience of implementing financial regulations and would expose the financial system to systemic risks.37 
The Guidelines limited the role of MNOs to providing the telecommunication network infrastructure for 
the use of MMOs.38 To this end, MNOs are required to implement a secure communication channel which is 
compliant with the technology standard stipulated in the Guideline.39 To encourage competition, MNOs are 
precluded from giving preferential treatments to any specific MMO in terms of price and traffic.40 Furthermore, 
MNOs must ensure that their subscribers can freely use any m-payment service of their choice.41 Reiterating their 
exclusion from providing payment services, the Guideline enjoins MNOs not to receive deposits from the public 
except for their subscribers’ airtime billing.42 They are also precluded from allowing the use of prepaid airtime 
value loaded by their subscribers to transfer monetary value or for payment purposes.43 
 
Although CBN released the Framework in 2009, it only began to receive applications for licenses in 2010. 
By 2014, CBN had issued licenses to 21 MMOs.44  In this period, some banks began to include m-payment 
services as part of the suite of services available on their mobile banking platforms. Many non-banks that received 
a license were unable to commence operations due to limited funds to build the required infrastructure and agent 
networks.45 The few non-bank platforms that were operational46 did not gain the traction comparable to 
counterparts like m-pesa. This was likely because they were not recognisable brands that could inspire consumer 




32 CBN Guidelines on mobile money services, above at note 30 at paragraph 3.0. 
33 Id at paragraph 7.1.   
34 Id at paragraph 5.0 
35 Id at paragraph 5.0(a). 
36 Id at paragraph 5.0(b). 
37 GSMA “What could we learn from Nigeria barring MNOs from participating in the mobile money market?” available at: 
<https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/region/sub-saharan-africa-region/what-could-we-learn-from-nigeria-barring-mnos-from-
participating-in-the-mobile-money-market/> (last accessed 20 March 2020) 
38 CBN Guidelines on mobile money services in Nigeria, above at note 30 at at paragraph 8.4. See also CBN Regulatory framework for mobile 
payments above at note 20 at paragraph 2.1.  
39 CBN Guidelines on mobile money services, above at note 30 at paragraph 8.4(b). 
40 Id at para 8.4 (c) & (h). 
41 Id at paragraph 8.4 (d). 
42 Id at paragraph 8.4(e). 
43 Id at paragraph 8.4. 
44 Available at: <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/FinInc/finservproviders.asp> (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
45 J Agumagu “Mobile money: boosting financial inclusion via recapitalization” (8 February 2018) New Telegraph, available at: 
<https://www.newtelegraphng.com/mobile-money-boosting-financial-inclusion-via-recapitalisation/> (last accessed 20 April 2020).  
46 E.g. Pagatech and Etranzact. 
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Phase II: 2015 – date   
Despite the number of licenses issued in the first phase, the m-payments market failed to record significant success 
in Nigeria. A 2016 survey revealed that 76 per cent of Nigerians were unfamiliar with mobile money and 98.7 per 
cent had never registered for or used a mobile money service.47  Owing to this failure, CBN began to embrace 
regulatory shifts most of which focused on ensuring that MMOs could access agent networks of other stakeholders 
like MNOs. The CBN’s focus is explained by its admission that: 
 
“agent networks present an opportunity to service people in areas that lack bank branches or other physical 
financial access points like ATMs. Consequently, a functional agent network is imperative for extending 
financial services to the unbanked. However, deficit of fixed location agents has been a challenge”.48  
 
 
In comparison to banks and other firms permitted to provide m-payments, MNOs have a well-dispersed 
network of existing outlets across Nigeria. In 2015, a Geospatial Mapping Survey of MNO access points captured 
about 8,533 operational outlets in Nigeria's 36 states and Federal Capital Territory.49  CBN, thus, recognized that 
the networks and recognisable brands of MNOs could be leveraged in driving the market. 
 Accordingly, in 2015, CBN released the Regulatory Framework for Licensing Super Agents in Nigeria.50 
Super-agents are parties contracted to act on behalf of financial institutions. The framework aims to encourage 
stakeholders like MNOs to share their agent networks with financial services providers like MMOs.51 MNOs 
licensed under this framework are granted ‘Super-Agent’ status and are permitted to sub-contract other agents 
who they will be responsible for.52 The scope of banking-related activities that super-agents or agents can 
undertake is defined under CBN's Guidelines for the Regulation of Agent Banking and Agent Banking 
Relationships in Nigeria.53 Agents can assist with functions like accepting cash deposits and withdrawals, bills 
and salaries, local funds transfer, etc.54  Super-agents can only use their platform to manage their agents’ activities 
and are precluded from holding electronic money value.55 Only licensed financial institutions remain permitted to 
provide and operate mobile money platforms and to hold electronic money value.56  
CBN, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders also launched the Shared Agent Network Expansion 
Facility (SANEF) programme to encourage the development and sharing of agent networks.57 Under this 
programme, participating institutions can share agents in rolling out financial services. Under the Super Agents 
licensing regime and the SANEF initiative, MNOs were viewed as “distribution actors”58 whose agent networks 
could be exploited. They remained excluded from taking the lead in providing services like m-payments.   
 
47 Enhancing Financial Innovation and Access “EFInA access to financial services in Nigeria 2016 survey” <https://www.efina.org.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Key-Findings-A2F-2016.pdf>  (last accessed 14 March 2020) at 32 & 35. 
48CBN “Exposure draft of the national financial inclusion strategy refresh” available at: 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2018/CCD/Exposure%20Draft%20of%20the%20National%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Strategy%20Refres
h_July%206%202018.pdf>  (last accessed 14 March 2020) at 27. 
49CBN “2016 annual report: national financial inclusion strategy implementation” available at: 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2018/CCD/Exposure%20Draft%20of%20the%20National%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Strategy%20Refresh
_July%206%202018.pdf> (last accessed 14 March 2020) at 64. 
50Available at: <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2015/bpsd/regulatory%20framework%20for%20licensing%20super-
agents%20in%20nigeria.pdf> (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
51 Alliance for Financial Inclusion “Central bank of Nigeria approves first licenses for super-agent banking” available at: <https://www.afi-
global.org/news/2016/08/central-bank-nigeria-approves-first-licenses-super-agent-banking>  (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
52 CBN Super Agents Licensing Framework, above at note 50 at paragraph 4.0.  
53CBN "Guidelines for the regulation of agent banking and agent relationships in Nigeria" available at: 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2013/ccd/guidelines%20for%20the%20regulation%20of%20agent%20banking%20and%20agent%20banking
%20relationships%20in%20nigeria.pdf> (last accessed 14 March 2020).  
54 Id at paragraph 6.2.  
55 CBN Super Agents Licensing Framework, above at note 50 at paragraph 6(a)(ii).   
56 Ibid. 
57 Available at: <https://www.sanefng.com/about-sanef> (last accessed 14 March 2020).  
58 CBN NFIS refresh, above at note 48 at 5. 
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In 2018, CBN revised the NFIS.59 A key issue recognized in the implementation of the 2012 NFIS was 
that mobile money had failed to take off owing to restrictive policies.60 The revised NFIS highlighted overarching 
policy principles which would inform its implementation. The first principle hinges on the adoption of an 
appropriate risk-based regulatory level playing field which ensures that the same set of regulatory requirements 
and conditions apply to all potential providers of a particular service regardless of their background or type of 
operation. 61  The second principle focuses on encouraging relevant actors to play to their areas of core strength 
to achieve high impact.  
These principles appear to have set the tone for the policy change heralded by the introduction of 
Guidelines for the Licensing and Regulation of Payment Service Banks (PSB guidelines).62 The PSB guidelines 
provide the framework for licensing niche banking institutions called payment service banks (PSBs). The main 
objective for setting up PSBs is to “enhance financial inclusion in rural areas by increasing access to deposit 
products and payment/remittance services…through high-volume low value transactions in a secured technology-
driven environment”.63 PSBs are permitted to maintain savings accounts and to accept deposits. They can also 
provide payments and remittance services and may operate an electronic purse.64 They cannot, however, grant 
any loans, advances or guarantees.65 
In what appears to be a significant departure from its previous policy stance, the PSB guidelines permit 
MNOs, through subsidiaries, to register as PSBs. Under this framework, MNOs may provide payment services if 
they meet the licensing requirements and are granted Approvals-In -Principle.66 In September 2019, CBN issued 
approvals in-principle to three entities, two of which are controlled by MNOs.67 While it is still early to assess 
whether the inclusion of MNOs as eligible promoters of PSBs will drive the m-payment market, Nigeria’s 
experience so far and this policy u-turn provides some lessons which can inform future attempts at regulating m-
payments.    
  
MATTERS ARISING – WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN?  
 
The participation of mobile network operators may be decisive in the successful roll-out of 
mobile payments 
CBN’s evolving position on MNOs directly providing m-payments raises questions about their (MNOs) role in 
driving the market. This article takes the position that CBN’s initial exclusion of MNOSs from direct participation 
was detrimental to the growth of the m-payments market. This view is held for several reasons.  First, it is 
 
59CBN “National Financial Inclusion Strategy (Revised)” available at: 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2019/ccd/national%20financial%20inclusion%20strategy.pdf>  (last  accessed 14 March 2020)  
60 Id at vi. 
61 Id at vii. 
62CBN “Guidelines for licensing and regulation of payment service banks in Nigeria” available at: 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2018/FPRD/OCTOBER%202018%20EXPOSURE%20PAYMENT%20BANK.pdf>   (last accessed 15 March 
2020) This was further revised in August 2020 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2020/CCD/APPROVED%20REVIEWED%20GUIDELINES%20FOR%20LICENSING%20AND%20REGU
LATION%20OF%20PAYMENT%20SERVICE%20BANKS%20IN%20NIGERIA-27AUG2020.pdf  
63 Id at paragraph 2.  
64 Id at paragraph 4.1. 
65 Id at paragraph 4.2.   
66 Id at paragraph 6.1. 
67 F Eleanya “CBN issues ‘approval-in-principle’ to glo, 9mobile, up subsidiaries for psb services” (19 September 2019) Business Day, 
available at: <https://businessday.ng/technology/article/cbn-issues-approval-in-principle-to-glo-9mobile-up-subsidiaries-for-psb-services/>  
(last accessed 15 March 2020). 
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supported by inferences that can be made from empirical research carried out by Evans and Pircho.68 Their study 
focused on discovering why m-payments succeeded in some countries and failed in others. The study identified 
eight countries in which m-payments recorded explosive growth.69 One common characteristic in these countries, 
save for one,70 was that there was no regulatory restriction on the parties that could provide m-payments.  In 
identifying the factors that could stimulate success, the study asserts that “the regulatory framework adopted by 
the government, in particular, the extent to which regulations restrict potential players, in particular mobile 
network operators (MNOs), from operating mobile money schemes … could facilitate or restrain success”.71 
Amongst 22 countries investigated by Evans and Pircho, there was only one success story that was not 
driven by an MNO-led scheme. The service, ‘bKash’, is sponsored by the BRAC bank in Bangladesh. The service 
is reportedly successful because it is supported by the MNOs that account for most subscribers in the country.72 
However, the service has been mostly useful in providing a platform that allows people to pay bills. Unlike with 
services that are MNO-led, it has not been successful as a platform for person-to-person transfers.73  Pakistan also 
has a successful bank-led platform, but their experience has been unique. In Pakistan, MNOs are not allowed to 
directly provide m-payments. To circumvent this, Telenor Pakistan, Pakistan's largest telecom operator acquired 
a 51 per cent stake in Tameer Bank to launch its m-payment service Easypaisa,74 Easypaisa enjoys an extensive 
agent network backed by Telenor Pakistan's distribution networks.75  
Evans and Pircho’s study appears to confirm that the key to unlocking m-payments rests with flexible 
regulations that permit direct participation by stakeholders like MNOs. Their conclusions are supported by a 2017 
study carried out by Riley and Kulathunga investigating four jurisdictions that  successfully leveraged electronic 
money and digital financial services in driving financial inclusion.76 They found that  the involvement of the 
private sector and non-bank entities, who were supported by flexibly designed policies, positively impacted 
financial inclusion statistics.77  MNOs are singled out as important stakeholders for several reasons. First, they 
have the communications network that allows for transactions to be performed in real-time.78 Second, they operate 
the subscriber identity module (SIM) cards which provide the technology to support SMS-based payment services 
like m-pesa. Third, they have easily recognisable brands and a vast retail distribution network of airtime sellers 
even in rural areas.79 They are also well-experienced in running high-volume, real-time prepaid platforms to a 
high standard of availability and reliability.80   
Regulatory shifts occurring in several countries, including Nigeria, is the second factor supporting the 
conclusion that the participation of MNOs is critical in driving the m-payments market. Evans and Pircho’s study 
 
68 DS Evans and A Pircho “An empirical examination of why mobile money schemes ignite in some developing countries but flounder in 
most” (2015) available at: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2413&context=law_and_economics> (last 
accessed 15 March 2020). 
69 Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Rwanda, Somaliland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe: Id at 6. 
70 Bangladesh’s case is considered later in this section. 
71 Evans & Pircho An empirical examination, above at note 68 at 10. 
72 Id at 17. 
73 Ibid. 
74  SE Senthe “Transformative technology in microfinance: delivering hope electronically” (2012) 13 Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol'y, I at 19. 
75 Evans & Pircho An empirical examination, above at note 68 at 19. 
76TA Riley and A Kulathunga “Bringing e-money to the poor: successes and failures” 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/340701503568346911/pdf/119070-PUB-PUBLIC-PUB-DATE-8-22-17.pdf> (last accessed 15 
March 2020)  
77 Ibid. 





identified eight countries in which m-payments have failed to ignite.81  The study found that all eight (including 
Nigeria) adopted a heavy-handed approach to regulating m-payments. Of the eight, seven required that banks take 
the lead or significantly participate in providing the service.82 Since the study was published, regulatory shifts 
have occurred in at least three countries: Ghana, India and Nigeria.83  In Nigeria and India, as we shall see 
subsequently, central bank authorities have moved from policies prohibiting the direct involvement of MNOs, to 
policies allowing MNOs to participate in the provision of m-payments through niche financial institutions 
(payment banks). 
In Ghana, the 2008 Guidelines for Branchless Banking favoured a bank-led business model for the 
provision of m-payments and required that at least three banks be involved in any service.84 This approach was 
described as ‘many to many’ and aimed to encourage interoperability which would allow the m-payments market 
to take off swiftly.85 MNOs were excluded from independently applying for licenses and were required to partner 
with banks. The m-payments market did not take off as expected. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP)’s research found that banks had little incentives to make significant investments under these 
arrangements.86  MNOs made most of the investments and felt disadvantaged because the regulations did not 
permit them to independently lead in providing the service.87 The failure to record success prompted regulatory 
reform which saw the passing of new guidelines for e-money issuers in 2015. The 2015 guidelines permit MNOs 
to apply to Ghana’s Central Bank for licenses.88 These regulatory shifts lend credence to the proposition that 
MNOs are critical in driving the m-payments market. 
 
 
Clues from Kenya: Flexible regulatory approaches may be more appropriate for innovative 
financial services like mobile payments   
 
Nigeria’s experience also raises questions about the impact of a chosen regulatory approach in the growth of 
innovative financial services like m-payments. This issue is significant because a regulator’s approach may 
provide either the right conditions that encourage innovation or may hinder its growth by compounding the risk 
already inherent in the acceptance of a novel product.89 Further light can be shed on this issue by juxtaposing 
CBN’s and CBK’s approach in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. Safaricom, an MNO, provides Kenya’s leading 
m-payment product, m-pesa. When m-pesa was launched in 2007, there were no regulations dedicated to m-
payments. As financial inclusion was a policy priority for CBK, it was interested in the success of m-pesa.90 The 
regulatory approach involved continuous dialogue between CBK and Safaricom before the product’s launch. 
 
81 Burkina Faso, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria and South Africa: Evans & Pircho An empirical examination, above at 
note 68 at 6. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Sri Lanka also moved from a bank-centric model, permitting non-banks to provide m-payments subject to capital requirements. Evans & 
Pircho An empirical examination, above at note 68 at 28. 
84 Bank of Ghana “Guidelines for Branchless Banking” (2008) available at:  
<https://dfsobservatory.com/sites/default/files/Bank%20of%20Ghana%20-%20Notice%20No.%20BG-GOV-SEC-2008-21%20-
%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Branchless%20Banking.pdf> (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
85 C Mckay, P Zetterli “Unintentional consequences: branchless banking in Ghana” (2013) available at: 
<http://www.cgap.org/blog/unintentional-consequences-branchless-banking-ghana> (last accessed 14 March 2020). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88Bank of Ghana “Guidelines for e-money issuers” <https://dfsobservatory.com/sites/default/files/Bank%20of%20Ghana%20-
%20Guidelines%20for%20E-Money%20Issuers%20in%20Ghana.pdf>  (last accessed 6 March 2020) at paragraph 7. 
89 E Gutierrez, S Singh “What regulatory frameworks are more conducive to mobile banking? empirical evidence from findex data” (2013) 
Policy Research working paper; no.WPS 6652. (World Bank), available at: 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208411468151504563/pdf/WPS6652.pdf>   (last accessed 14 April 2020) at 3. 
90 AA Lashitew, R Van Tulder, Y Liasse “Mobile Phones for financial inclusion: what explains the diffusion of mobile money innovations?” 
(2019) 48/5 Research Policy 1201 at 1210. 
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When Safaricom submitted its proposal, CBK conducted an internal review which focused on clarifying specific 
areas of concern.91 First, CBK was concerned about the legal status of m-pesa: it needed to decide whether to 
classify it as a banking business. Second, it was concerned about the money laundering risks introduced by the 
product. Third, CBK sought to understand the operational risks associated with the service.  
Following legal advice, CBK reached several conclusions that informed its regulatory stance.92  First, it 
decided that m-pesa was not a banking service as defined under Kenya’s Banking Act.93 This was because the 
cash exchanged for electronic value was not repaid on demand and remained in the customer’s control.94  Second, 
it concluded that there was no credit risk for customers or Safaricom because m-pesa agents were required to 
make upfront deposits of cash in m-pesa accounts held by local banks.95 Third,  CBK established that there was 
no intermediation.96 Customer funds were not lent in the pursuit of other business, interest or income, and all 
funds were held in a trust account and could not be accessed by Safaricom to fund other parts of its business.97 
Fourth, CBK found that m-pesa was developed with anti-money laundering (AML) measures in mind. There were 
functions supporting the generation of electronic trails and suspicious transaction monitoring. Transaction caps 
were also set on individual and aggregate daily transactions and international remittances.98  Finally, CBK 
concluded that m-pesa’s operational risk was minimized as there was end-to-end encryption of the SIM card to 
ensure security and live back-up. CBK requested that Safaricom undertake comprehensive technical assessments 
carried out by Consult Hyperion99 to evaluate the operational risks of the m-pesa platform.100 The service passed 
Consult Hyperion’s tests for operational capacity.101 It was found that there were reporting and monitoring 
mechanisms that ensured that CBK could request information concerning the firm’s audit trail, AML procedures, 
liquidity management and clearing/settlement.102  
CBK also held consultations with the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK), Safaricom’s primary 
regulator.103 These consultations revealed that CAK considered m-pesa to be a value-added service that Safaricom 
was licensed to offer.104 Based on these findings, m-pesa was not regulated as a financial service.  CBK concluded 
that m-pesa had adequate controls in areas that could affect financial stability and issued it a Letter of No 
Objection.105  
M-pesa’s success has partly been attributed to CBK ‘s liberal regulatory approach106 which has been 
described as a ‘test and learn’ method that is implemented on a case-by-case basis.107 In this approach, non-bank 
 
91 Alliance for Financial Inclusion “Enabling mobile money transfer: the central bank of Kenya’s treatment of m-pesa” (2010)   available at: 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/enablingmobilemoneytransfer92.pdf> (last accessed 15 March 
2020) at 4.  
92 Ibid.  
93 1999 (as amended). 
94 AFI Enabling mobile money transfer above at note 91 at 4. 
95 Ibid. 
96 This is the process where banks take in funds from a depositor at low-interest rates and lend them out at higher interest rates to make some 
profit. Available at <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/financial-intermediation.html> (last accessed 10 March 2020). 
97 AFI Enabling mobile money transfer above at note 91 at 4. 
98 Ibid. 
99 This is a specialized consultancy specialising in secure electronic transactions.  <http://www.chyp.com/> (last accessed 10 March 2020). 
100 Riley & Kalathunga Bringing e-money to the poor, above at note 76 at 66. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 At Safaricom’s launch the regulator was known as the Communications Commission of Kenya. 
104  AFI Enabling mobile money transfer, above at note 91 at 6. 
105 CBK released a public statement in 2009 outlining their position on m-pesa. Ibid at 7. 
106 DER Goncalves “Financial inclusion in Peru: lessons from Kenya's regulatory approach on e-money” (2013) 21 U.Miami Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 31 at 33. 
107 DA Zetzsche, RP Buckley, JN Barberis and DW Arner “Regulating a revolution: from regulatory sandboxes to smart regulation” (2018) 
23 Fordham J.Corp. & Fin. L. 31 at 58. 
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providers can benefit from regulatory forbearance like the Letter of No Objection granted by CBK or restricted 
licenses or special charters.108 In such circumstances: 
 
‘In return for the regulator's "clarification" that the FinTech firm's activity is outside the scope of certain 
rules which are viewed as unnecessary or inappropriate under the circumstances or in the specific 
context, the no-action letter or restricted license may be supplemented with conditions seeking to ensure 
that even if certain rules do not apply, the principles underlying the regulation are still upheld. The 
practical effect of forbearance through no-action letters, restricted licensing, or special charters is that 
of partial exemptions or dispensation within a broader regulatory framework’.109 
 
This approach’s advantage is that it encourages communication between regulators and innovators. 
Regulators can study business models and risk assessments and request clarifications where needed.110 This allows 
regulators to obtain sufficient data and experience that informs their regulatory response.111 However, the main 
drawback with this approach is that it is more suitable where the number of firms requesting exemptions is small. 
Where more firms request bespoke exemptions, this will increase costs and put a strain on regulatory capacity.112 
It may also be challenging to ensure that equal treatment is extended to each participant.113 This can lead to 
unintended consequences. For instance, from a competition perspective, Kenya’s approach provided Safaricom 
with a dominant market position. Safaricom’s dominance attracted criticism which forced regulators to call for 
the implementation of interoperability between m-pesa and other mobile money services.114 Such dominance can 
negatively impact competition, leaving consumers with limited choices since providers have little incentives to 
improve the quality of their services or to preserve their reputation.115 It can also lead to the creation of “too big 
to fail” providers which invites serious consequences. The failure of a large provider like Safaricom can lead to a 
system-wide disruption in the economy and can have serious reputational consequences for regulators.116 Such 
disruptions can also discourage potential users of similar services which can jeopardize financial inclusion gains. 
Zetzsche et al also point out that this approach may lead to long term uncertainty for businesses.117 This 
suggests that the flexible case-by-case assessment is more appropriate in the early stages of regulating a new 
product. This approach in the early stages of regulation allows regulators to gather the information and experience 
required to issue rules that will apply to future innovators.  Again, Kenya’s experience fits with this. Despite its 
success, m-pesa highlighted a gap in the regulation of payment services in Kenya.118 Consequently, the National 
Payment Systems Regulations (NPSRs) was passed in 2014. The NPSRs introduced new regulatory rules for the 
payment sector and identified CBK as the primary supervisory authority for payment service providers (PSPs).119 
 
108 Ibid. 
109 Id at 59. 
110 Id at 62 
111 Id at 61–62; DW Arner, DA Zetzsche, et al “FinTech and regtech: enabling innovation while preserving financial stability” (2017) 18 Geo. 
J. Int'l Aff. 47 at 52. 
112 Zetzsche et al Regulating a Revolution, above at note 107 at 62. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 AB Kernan “Sustaining the growth of mobile money services in developing nations: lessons from overregulation in the United States' 
(2018) 51 Vand J Transnat'l L 1109 at 1148.  
116 B Fung, M Molico and G Stuber “Electronic money and payments: recent developments and issues' (2014) available at: 
<https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/dp2014-2.pdf> (last accessed 18 September 2020) at 2 
117 Zetzsche et al Regulating a Revolution, above at note 107 at 63–64. 
118  AFI Enabling mobile money transfer, above at note 91 at 6. 
119 Regulation 30. Section 2 of Kenya’s National Payment System Act (2011) defines a “payment service provider” as - 
“i. a person, company or organisation acting as provider in relation to sending, receiving, storing or processing of 
payments or the provision of other services in relation to payment services through any electronic system;  
ii. a person, company or organisation which owns, possesses, operates, manages or controls a public switched network 
for the provision of payment services; or  
iii. any other person, company or organisation that processes or stores data on behalf of such payment service providers 
or users of such payment services”  
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The NPSRs set out basic e-money rules and require interested firms to apply for authorization/ registration.120 
MNOs may be designated as PSPs or e-money issuers.121  
Unlike Kenya, Nigeria adopted a less-flexible approach to regulating m-payments. CBN released the 
Framework document in 2009 before any m-payment service was launched and only began to receive applications 
for licenses in 2010. Out of about 40 applicants, only 18 received approvals-in-principle with a requirement to 
build m-payments platforms and run pilots within three months.122  Certain problems are associated with  CBN’s 
approach. First, the 2009 Framework contained prescriptive requirements dictating the acceptable business 
models, technology, the methods through which m-payments could be carried out and the operational 
arrangements for delivering m-payments. By designing regulations before any m-payment service was launched 
and before considering any approvals-in-principle, CBN did not have the opportunity to understand the service 
before it issued regulations. Second, CBN failed to take advantage of the chance to gather relevant information 
during the mandated pilots. CBN required applicants to build and pilot m-payments platforms within three months.  
This pilot period was short, and only two applicants met CBN’s deadline.123 This contrasts with Kenya, where m-
pesa was piloted with CBK’s support two years before its launch.124  This period gave sufficient time for Safaricom 
to adjust its product offering to reflect market needs and also gave CBK more time to gather information on the 
product.125  CBN’s short mandatory pilot period arguably failed to give applicants enough time to adjust their 
product offering. It does not also appear that the pilots enabled CBN to gather further information that would 
influence regulations. This is because the regulatory framework was not updated until four years after the pilots. 
Kenya and Nigeria’s contrasting experience highlights the dilemma that authorities face in deciding what 
regulatory approach is more appropriate for innovative products. No consensus exists on the most suitable 
regulatory strategy. While some writers suggest full regulation that resembles prudential banking regulations, 
others call for a “tailored regime” and warn against “unnecessary or over-reactive" regulation.126 Although 
Nigeria's early adoption of full regulations can be interpreted as heavy-handed, it can be justified on the basis that 
maintaining the safety of the financial system is at the core of the mandate of central banks.127 However, the 
problem rests in the inability to draw a balance between protecting the financial system and encouraging 
innovation, which in turn can increase inclusion. Since innovation can positively impact financial inclusion, it is 
reasonable to embrace a flexible regulatory approach like Kenya’s which can adapt to changes in the financial 
services landscape.128  
Regulators can implement Kenya’s test and learn approach in ways that best fit their jurisdictions. An 
increasingly popular and more structured option is the use of regulatory sandboxes.129 A regulatory sandbox is a 
“safe space in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models and delivery mechanisms 
 
120 Regulation 4.   
121 This is a payment service provider authorized to issue electronic money under the NPSRs: Regulation 2. 
122 P Shrivastava “The Hold-up with Mobile Money in Nigeria” available at <https://cfi-blog.org/2015/08/13/the-hold-up-with-mobile-money-
in-nigeria/> (last accessed 10 April 2020).   
123 Ibid. 
124 M-pesa’s pilot ran from October 2005 to October 2006. N Hughes, S Lonie “M-pesa: mobile money for the ‘unbanked’ turning cellphones 
into 24-hour tellers in Kenya” (2007) 2/1 ITGG 63 at 74 & 77.   
125 International Finance Corporation “M-money channel distribution case – Kenya: safaricom m-pesa” available at: 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/832831500443778267/pdf/117403-WP-KE-Tool-6-7-Case-Study-M-PESA-Kenya-Series-IFC-
mobile-money-toolkit-PUBLIC.pdf>  (last accessed 14 April 2020) at 4. 
126M Crowe, M Kepler, C Merritt “The U.S. regulatory landscape for mobile payments” (2012) available at <https://www.frbatlanta.org/-
/media/documents/rprf/rprf_pubs/120730wp.pdf>  (last accessed 14 April 2020) at 11; R Bollen “A discussion of best practice in the regulation 
of payment services: part 1”  (2010) 25/8 JIBLR 370 at 373.   
127 O Bar-Gill, E Warren “Making Credit Safer” (2009)157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 at 90. 
128 E. Eraker, C Hector, C Hoofnagle “Mobile payments: the challenge of protecting consumers and innovation” (2011) 10 PSLR 212 at 216. 
129 L de Koker, N Morris, S Jaffer “Regulating financial services in an era of technological disruption” (2020) 36/2 Law in Context 90 at 95. 
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without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question.”130 
With standardised eligibility requirements, sandboxes aim to encourage competitive innovation while enhancing 
the open and transparent exchange of information between regulators and innovators.131 Such flow of information 
can inform future regulatory policies. In our context, sandboxes can be useful for emphasising financial inclusion 
objectives. Where this is a policy priority, regulators can implement thematic sandboxes where preference is given 
to innovation that supports inclusion.132  
As a recent approach to regulating financial services innovation, there is not enough empirical evidence 
yet of the impact of sandboxes.133 However, early research suggests that while sandboxes can contribute to 
developing evidence-based policy, they are insufficient in themselves in promoting innovation or financial 
inclusion.134 Hence regulators must engage in implementing broader reforms which support innovation, regulatory 
capacity, market engagement and financial inclusion.135 As sandboxes are not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, some 
researchers call for a focus on broader alternatives that reflect the priorities and capacity of regulators as well as 
encourages the general development of innovation ecosystems.136 These alternatives could focus on providing 
dedicated spaces (e.g. innovation hubs) or institutions (e.g. innovation offices) aimed at supporting innovators. 
 
 
Niche financial institutions may present an attractive compromise but do not guarantee results 
As indicated earlier, the latest regulatory update in Nigeria has seen the introduction of niche financial institutions 
(PSBs) which are permitted to provide m-payments. Under the new framework, MNOs through their subsidiaries 
can directly participate providing m-payments. This appears to be a compromise between two policy positions, 
i.e. excluding MNOs from providing the service and allowing them to directly participate but within the regulatory 
control of CBN. The idea of PSBs is not novel and Nigeria may have been inspired by India. Like Nigeria, India’s 
initial response to regulating m-payments was to exclude MNOs from providing the service. Only licensed banks 
with a physical presence in India were initially permitted to offer m-payments.137 These services were also 
restricted to existing bank customers and/or credit and debit cardholders.138 Justifying its initial strict bank-led 
approach, the then Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) declared that RBI believed that 
 
130 Financial Conduct Authority “Regulatory Sandbox” (2015) available at: <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-
sandbox.pdf > (last accessed 18 September 2020) at paragraph 1.2. 
131 M Wechsler, L Perlman, and N Gurung “The state of regulatory sandboxes in developing countries (2018). available at: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285938> (last accessed 18 September 2020) at 24. 
132Central Banks in Sierra Leone and Malaysia have adopted this approach. S Duff, A growing trend in financial regulation: thematic 
sandboxes” (2019) available at:  <https://www.cgap.org/blog/growing-trend-financial-regulation-thematic-sandboxes> (last accessed 18 
September 2020). 
133 UNSGSA FinTech Working Group and CCAF “Early lessons on regulatory innovations to enable inclusive fintech: innovation offices, 
regulatory sandboxes, and regtech” (2019) available at: 
<https://www.unsgsa.org/files/2915/5016/4448/Early_Lessons_on_Regulatory_Innovations_to_Enable_Inclusive_FinTech.pdf>  (last 
accessed 18 September 2020) at 29. 
134 Id at 30. 
135 Ibid. 
136 RP Buckley, D Arner et al “Building fintech ecosystems: regulatory sandboxes, innovation hubs and beyond” (2020) 61 Wash. U L. & 
Pol'y 55 at 58; UNSGSA FinTech Working Group Early Lessons, above at note 133 at 20; I Jenik and K Lauer “Regulatory sandboxes and 
financial inclusion” (2017) available at: <https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Working-Paper-Regulatory-Sandboxes-Oct-2017.pdf> (last 
accessed 18 September 2020) at10 
137 Reserve Bank of India “Mobile Banking Transactions in India - Operative Guidelines for Banks” available at:  
<https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FS_Notification.aspx?Id=10509&fn=9&Mode=0#6 > (last accessed 15 April 2020) at paragraph 6.1. 
138 Id at paragraph 6.2.  
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"sustainable financial inclusion is achievable only through mainstream financial institutions, i.e. banks."139 He 
further explained that: 
 
“In India, we have adopted a bank-led model for financial inclusion, which seeks to leverage on 
technology…. Our experience shows that the goal of financial inclusion is better served through 
mainstream banking institutions as only they have the ability to offer the suite of products required 
to bring in effective/meaningful financial inclusion”.140 
 
 
In 2014, RBI adjusted its stance by opening the playing field to non-banks.141  However, it held on to its initial 
belief that banking institutions were better placed to drive inclusion. Hence, RBI permitted non-banks to provide 
payment services only if they registered as newly created banking institutions (payments banks) offering a range 
of financial services. Accordingly, it issued Guidelines for the licensing of payments banks (Licensing 
Guidelines).142 RBI stated that the primary objective for introducing payment banks is to further financial 
inclusion.143  MNOs, supermarket chains, non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) and public sector companies 
are amongst the classes of persons eligible to apply for licenses.144 The regulatory change provided a leeway for 
MNOs to participate in the provision of m-payments. Like Nigeria, payment banks may provide savings accounts 
and payment/remittance services but cannot offer credit.145    
The justification for payment banks is that they offer a broad suite of services beyond m-payments. 
Providing additional services reflects RBI’s belief that a superior model for improving inclusion is one that 
supports additional banking services alongside m-payments.146 While this is an important consideration, if there 
is no demand for the additional services, then the introduction of payment banks may be strategically poor.  This 
is because for innovation to succeed, it should be designed to respond to an unmet need expressed by consumers 
and should not be based on assumptions of what consumers want.147 Some examples buttress this point. M-pesa 
is partly successful because the product’s design addressed the existing need for low cost person-to-person 
transfers.148 Although the initial product proposal focused on microfinance transactions, consumer feedback 
during the pilot prompted changes that made the product functionally relevant.149 Reflecting the market need at 
its launch, Safaricom focused on providing a convenient and cost-effective domestic platform for sending money 
from urban areas to rural communities.150 This can be contrasted with unsuccessful attempts in other jurisdictions. 
In South Africa, for instance, a product called WIZZIT was introduced to provide a full suite of banking services 
to the unbanked. Besides stiff regulatory roadblocks faced by WIZZIT’s founders, a Harvard study suggests that 
 
139 KC Chakrabarty “The first mile walk into financial inclusion -thinking differently” Address by the Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of 
India, at the Financial Inclusion Conference (2012 ) available at: <http://www.agloc.org/pdf/august_07_2012.pdf> at paragraph 14. 
140 Id at paragraph 12. 
141 Reserve Bank of India “Guidelines for Licensing of Payments Banks” available at: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx?Id=2900  
(last accessed 13 April 2020). 
142 This approach is described as the “Narrow banking” model where banking licences are granted to non-banking firms to carry out deposit 
and payment services but not credit services. See Mobile Money Association of India (MMAI) and the GSM Association (GSMA) “Mobile 
money: the opportunity for India” (2013) available at: <https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MMAI-
GSMA-on-Mobile-Money-in-India-for-RBI-Financial-Inclusion-Committee_Dec13.pdf>  (last accessed 13 April 2020) at 19. 
143 RBI Licensing Guidelines, above at note 141 at paragraph 2. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Id at paragraph 4. 
146 KC Chakrabarty “M-banking in India - regulations and rationale” Address by Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at the International 
Banking Summit on Regulation of Cross-Border Mobile Payments and Regional Financial Integration (2012) available at: 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r120330f.pdf> (last accessed 13 April 2020). 
147 Riley & Kalathunga Bringing e-money to the poor, above at note 76 at 57. 
148 Lashitew et al Mobile phones for financial inclusion, above at note 90 at1209.  
149 Ibid. 
150 ES Kobor “The role of anti-money laundering law in mobile money systems in developing countries” (2013) 8 Wash. J L.Tech. & Arts 
303, at 307–308. 
 14 
one of the reasons behind the product’s failure was that it was launched without much consideration of the market 
demand for services offered.151   
So far, payments banks have not made a substantial impact in India. While 11 in-principle approvals were 
granted to applicants in 2015, by 2018 only four of the 11 payments banks remained operational.152 These banks  
registered weak performances incurring net losses in the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 financial year.153 Their 
lacklustre performance has been attributed to limited revenue streams.154 This is a direct consequence of stringent 
regulations which dictate the business model that they can adopt.155 Although registered as banks, they are 
prohibited from engaging in any lending activity and cannot make any profit from interests. The revenue margins 
from deposits are also small as there is a cap on the deposits that they can accept.156 At the same time, they must 
offer attractive interests on deposits if they wish to compete with traditional banks.157   
Although it is too early to fully assess the impact of niche institutions like payment banks, two points must 
be made. First, while it is important that excluded persons can access a wide range of financial products in the 
long run, it may be more sustainable to allow providers to organically develop products that reflect market needs. 
Hence, user-driven extensions of essential payment services may be more viable in the long term. Understanding 
the needs of the underserved and building their trust and familiarity with basic digital financial services will likely 
convert them to account holders in the long term.158 M-pesa continues to stay relevant because it constantly 
adapted and extended its functionalities based on customer feedback and changing market trends.159 From 
focusing on basic services like facilitating person-to-person payments, airtime purchases and cash withdrawals 
from agents, m-pesa has expanded its services over the years to include transfers to and from regular bank 
accounts, international remittances, and microinsurance. 160 It also went on to partner with the Commercial Bank 
of Africa to offer M-Shwari, a micro-credit service.161 
Second, India’s experience raises questions about whether niche banking institutions will encourage MNO 
involvement in driving the m-payments market. India’s experience may suggest that such institutions can 
disincentivize MNOs from investing. MNOs are not financial institutions but will be subject to stringent banking 
regulations if they register as niche banking institutions. With restrictions on their activities which limits the 





151 V Kasturi Rangan & K Lee “Mobile banking for the unbanked” (2012) available at 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=39405 (last accessed 27 July 2020) 
152 SK Reddy, SA Sarat “Announcement of payment banks and stock performance of commercial banks in India” (2018) 23/1 JIBC 1 at 4. 
153 Reserve Bank of India “Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2017-18” available at: 
<https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/0RTP2018_FE9E97E7AF7024A4B94321734CD76DD4F.PDF>  (last accessed 10 April 
2020) 
154 R Merwin “Why five out of the 11 payment banks have shut shop” (10 September 2019) The Hindu BusinessLine available, at: 
<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/five-out-of-the-11-payments-banks-have-shut-operations-
why/article29381134.ece> (last accessed 13 April 2020) 
155 State Bank of India “Payments banks: a case of near yet too far” (2019) 
<https://sbi.co.in/documents/13958/126691/Ecowrap_20190722.pdf> last accessed 15 April 2020. 
156 They cannot accept deposits over 1 lakh: Ibid. 
157 Merwin Why five out of the 11 payment banks have shut shop, above at note 155. 
158 Riley & Kalathunga Bringing e-money to the poor, above at note 76 at 57. 
159 Lashitew et al Mobile phones for financial inclusion, above at note 90 at 1209. 
160 Id at 1208; Hughes & Lonie M-pesa: mobile money for the ‘unbanked’, above at note 124 at 78.  
161 P Ondiege “Regulatory impact on mobile money and financial inclusion in African countries - Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda” 
available at:< https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/Background-Paper-Financial-Inclusion-Ondiege.pdf>  (last accessed 12 March 2020) 
at 22. 
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Regulators must carefully consider which mobile payment models will best achieve identified 
policy goals 
M-payments can be provided using several business models. There are divergent views on which model is best 
suited for driving the market.  For instance, Rajan argues that the best model for m-payments is one where MNOs 
only act as intermediaries between consumers and financial institutions.162  This view is justified on the basis that 
financial regulations are onerous and limiting the role of MNOs to intermediaries will ensure that the cost of 
extending financial regulations to MNOs is avoided.163 Moreover, while innovation like m-payments can increase 
financial inclusion, it is disruptive and can introduce negative externalities.164 These externalities may include 
prudential risks which can negatively affect the safety of the financial system. Non-banking institutions are not 
traditionally saddled with managing financial transactions, and, therefore, have a limited understanding of the 
prudential risks involved. Their limited experience further suggests that they will also have limited risk 
management abilities.165 Arguments in favour of bank-led models are often justified based on the above points. 
In contrast, commentators like Alexandre et al argue that in jurisdictions where banks cannot profitably 
serve a significant number of people, regulators should allow a broader range of participants who face different 
cost structures and economic incentives to contest the market directly.166 Supporting this view, Porteous argues 
that given the weakness of the retail banking sector in many developing countries, it is necessary that non-bank 
players, particularly MNOs with their strong retail brands and established networks, be able to issue e-money.167 
He further argues that even if non-banks decide not to invest, the threat of possible entry may galvanize a response 
from banks.168 Under this approach, non-bank players like MNOs may be permitted to directly provide m-
payments in different ways. One method may allow MNOs to acquire direct licenses to provide the service without 
any substantial changes to their structure. This was the case with Kenya’s m-pesa. Another method may require 
that they participate through niche banking institutions, as is the case in India and Nigeria. 
While banks and MNOs remain critical to providing fund settlement and mobile network facilities 
respectively, m-payments can be provided by other electronic money firms that are neither banks nor MNOs. 169 
The involvement of such firms promises a more competitive market which will leave consumers with increased 
choices. While promising, this model can face certain difficulties. First, initial investment costs will be high as 
such providers will need to enter separate agreements with participating banks and MNOs to run their service. 
Second, where such providers are new, they may not be popular enough to inspire consumer trust, and many 
excluded persons may refrain from embracing their services. Third, such providers may have limited agent 
networks due to the high costs of establishing them. If this is the case, they will struggle to achieve the coverage 
that MNOs and banks, to a lesser extent, enjoy. This will mean that in many developing countries, they may not 
gain traction outside urban areas. Finally, owing to the scale of the services that they provide, MNOs and banks 
 
162 MA Rajan “The future of wallets: a look at the privacy implications of mobile payments” (2012) 20 Commercial Law Conspectus 445 at 
468–9.  
163Ibid. 
164 Riley & Kalathunga Bringing e-money to the poor, above at note 76 at 64. 
165 Id at 47. 
166 Alexandre et al Regulating new banking models, above at note 78 at 116–134. 
167 D Porteous “The enabling environment for mobile banking in Africa” available at: 
<https://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-the-enabling-environment-for-mobile-banking-in-africa-may-
2006_0.pdf> (last accessed 15 April 2020) at 50. 
168 Ibid. 
169 PL Chatain, A Zerzan, W Noor, et al Protecting Mobile Money against Financial Crimes: Global Policy Challenges and Solutions (2011) 
available at: <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/854951468337169489/pdf/600600PUB0ID181Mobile09780821386699.pdf> 
(last accessed 19 September 2020) at 10, 19, 66. 
 16 
are well-experienced in operations management which other providers may lack. Where providers lack such 
capacity, their inexperience can lead to operational challenges which may run them out of business.170  
Some writers argue for hybrid models which involve alliances between the two crucial parties in the m-
payments transaction process: banks and MNOs. This model is thought to represent the most beneficial model for 
all parties involved because it allows them to retain their core functions.171 Where a collaboration occurs, banks 
will leverage their experience in settling payments while MNOs will leverage the extensive reach of their agent 
networks. While this model has its advantages, a collaboration between key stakeholders can be challenging to 
achieve. For example, despite m-pesa’s success, Safaricom’s172 early attempts to collaborate with a bank (Equity 
Bank) in introducing another platform “M-kesho” was unsuccessful. This failure was partly attributed to the 
difficulty associated with managing complex issues like the division of responsibilities and the sharing of revenue 
which led to friction.173 Despite these challenges, this model may be the most sustainable in the long term since 
it combines the advantages of the bank-led and MNO-led models. A model which allows parties to focus on their 
core competencies will likely make the most economic sense to competing participants.  Hence, in the long run, 
it is anticipated that participants may voluntarily choose to collaborate in offering m-payments. As Alexander et 
al point out-  
 
“Product development will remain the preserve of banks, as telecom companies have no expertise 
and likely no desire to develop financial products beyond basic transactional services. This difference 
in aspirations and comparative advantages should establish a strong basis for partnerships between 
mobile operators that will be motivated by the growth in transaction volume and banks that will be 
more interested in accessing float and cross-selling and up-selling products to clients”.174 
 
While agreeing that a hybrid may be the most useful model, it is submitted that such collaborative 
partnerships ought to occur organically, based on voluntary terms agreed between participants. If regulators 
mandate hybrids, participants may be reluctant to invest if they are unready to make necessary commitments. 
Affirming this argument, in many countries where providing m-payments is not restricted to banks, MNOs have 
chosen to partner with them.175 Although the Kenyan Bankers Association initially resisted m-pesa, many Kenyan 
banks incorporated m-pesa with their own core applications to cut down their operational costs,  setting the stage 
for further collaboration. Since 2010, Safaricom, the MNO behind m-pesa, has formed partnerships with several 
banks to offer other products like savings accounts, micro-credit and insurance.176  
In deciding what model to promote, regulators must consider how the merits and demerits of the different 
arrangements highlighted above can impact identified policy objectives.  Porteous argues that enabling regulatory 
environments should allow for the development of business models that meet a defined policy objective.177 Hence, 
if a regulator’s objective is to increase financial inclusion using m-payments, then it ought to support the models 
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that can make this possible. If a significant percentage of a country’s populace cannot access formal financial 
services due to limited bank branches or service channels, then regulators should embrace models which 
encourage the participation of actors who have good agent networks in underserved areas. This suggests that 
MNO-led models or hybrid models will likely record transformative success in comparison to bank-led models. 
This is because if a primary reason for exclusion is poor bank branch penetration, addressing this problem by 
introducing a bank-centric solution only leads back to the origin of the problem. If regulation places banks at the 
centre of driving the m-payments market, it indirectly makes a relationship with a bank a prerequisite for m-
payments which in effect shuts out already excluded consumers. 
In many countries where mobile money services have contributed to increasing inclusion, regulations have 
permitted flexible models which support the participation of the stakeholders with extensive agent networks. Apart 
from Kenya, another example may be seen in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has taken advantage of the extensive reach 
of its post office network to encourage models that allow for the delivery of digital financial services. The post 
office department has an extensive network of 9,886 post offices across the country, which has proved vital in 
providing a mobile money order service.178 This department provides a mobile money order service in partnership 
with the second largest MNO in Bangladesh (Banglalink Mobile Company) which has an extensive network 
coverage area. This partnership allows for the service to be accessible at numerous postal outlets, including areas 
with little or no internet connectivity.179  
 
 
LOOKING AHEAD: THINKING BEYOND THE PLAYERS AND FOCUSING ON THE REGULATORY 
RISKS   
 
M-payments raise several regulatory concerns which may include the potential abuse of the financial system, data 
protection risks, and consumer protection challenges, to name a few. For regulators wishing to leverage m-
payments in driving financial inclusion, the key consideration should be how they can design appropriate 
responses which address these risks.  This is because the positive impact of any form of innovation, including m-
payments, will only remain credible in the long term if regulators can identify and address the specific risks that 
attract negative externalities. Accordingly, regulatory resources are best channelled towards analysing trends in 
the m-payments market to identify and understand risks and to design safeguards to address them.180 
For instance, where regulators permit non-banking institutions to provide m-payments, such institutions 
are unlikely to have the sophisticated experience required for asset and liquidity management. This inexperience 
can introduce systemic risks which requires that regulators adopt mechanisms which can lessen such risks. In 
Kenya for example, the NPSRs  introduce a core capital requirement for authorized PSPs.181 PSPs are also 
prohibited from engaging in any lending or investment activity other than those permitted under the NPSRs.182 
Where a PSP is involved in other unrelated ventures, it must keep its payment service in a separate business unit 
and must maintain a separate management structure and books of account.183 PSPs are consequently mandated to 
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create a trust to cover consumer funds.184 They are also obliged to adopt appropriate risk mitigation strategies 
which ensure that consumer funds are placed in commercial banks and diversified.185 
Similarly, in India, payments banks are required to invest 75 per cent of their demand deposit balances in 
government securities/treasury bills with maturity up to one year.186 They must also hold a maximum of 25 per 
cent in current and time/fixed deposits with other scheduled commercial banks.187 All other financial and non-
financial activities of its promoters must be ring-fenced and should not be mingled with the banking and financial 
services business of the payments bank.188 To provide a buffer against operational risks, RBI requires that a 
minimum paid-up equity capital of one hundred crores must be maintained.189  
Another critical concern for regulators is ensuring that innovation does not leave the financial system open 
to abuse. To achieve this, regulators must impose arrangements which seek to maintain financial integrity.  For 
instance, the potential misuse of the financial system may be mitigated by requiring that providers adopt customer 
registration and verification measures which ensure that persons using the services can be identified. In reality, 
balancing such arrangements with financial inclusion policies can be a difficult task. This is because regulators 
and regulated institutions are often cautious about breaching international standards aimed at combating the abuse 
of the financial system. This can lead to inflexible and inappropriate measures which may prevent people from 
accessing formal financial services.190 For instance, in many developing countries, some persons find themselves 
financially excluded because they cannot satisfy regulatory requirements like those mandated for customer 
identification and verification purposes.191 To address this, the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF), the lead inter-
governmental body that sets standards aimed at combating money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF), 
has released several guidance documents to support regulators.192 Central to the FATF’s advice is a call for 
regulators to apply a risk-based approach.193 This means that regulators ought to develop flexible and 
proportionate responses that address actual risks flagged up in their risk assessment. The understanding is that if 
regulators take advantage of the flexibility allowed by the risk-based approach, they can tailor measures that are 
attuned to their jurisdictions which will not negatively impact financial inclusion.  
The FATF also requires that financial institutions develop internal policies that address ML and TF risks194 
and encourages the inclusion of AML/CFT195 risk assessments in the development of new products.196 M-pesa’s 
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development process exemplifies adherence to this.197 As discussed earlier, CBK satisfied itself that the product 
was designed to mitigate ML/TF risks and that Safaricom’s internal AML/CFT policy was sufficient. This was 
reflected in functionalities which supported transaction caps,198 suspicious transaction reporting199 and the 
generation of electronic transactional trails.200  
Practical implementation of the FATF’s guidance will require that regulators also implement other broader 
reforms. For example, to ensure that customer identification and verification processes are not exclusionary, 
regulators must develop national identification systems which will make it easier for excluded persons to satisfy 
such requirements. Beyond Kenya’s regulatory flexibility, m-pesa’s success has also been attributed to the fact 
that Kenya already had a workable national identification system when it was launched. This helped to lessen the 
customer registration and verification requirements needed to open an m-pesa account.201   
De Koker and Jentzsch point out that while adherence to the FATF standards promises increased 
transparency in the financial system, it can introduce other considerations from a privacy perspective.202 AML 
procedures require that personal information about customers as well as their transaction trails are collected and 
stored. In developing countries with weak data protection frameworks, this can be problematic. The potential for 
unremedied data breaches and the likelihood that personal and transaction information can be misused even by 
government authorities may discourage people from transacting within the formal financial sector.203  To alleviate 
these concerns, regulators and lawmakers must design robust privacy and data protection laws. 
Excluded persons are usually the target of innovative products seeking to drive inclusion. Because these 
persons are often vulnerable due to their circumstance, regulators must design measures which ensure that they 
are no worse off in adopting such services.204 Such efforts will cover issues like protecting consumer funds which 
can be addressed by the prudential measures discussed earlier. These efforts should also address other consumer 
protection concerns which may lead to personal consumer detriment.205 With m-payments, for instance, 
consumers may be subjected to unfair commercial practices like the use of unfair contract terms. M-payment 
services will be offered to consumers on standard form contracts which will be available on a take it or leave it 
basis. Such contracts are prone to abuse as they are one-sided and do not permit negotiations. This problem is 
exacerbated in many developing countries where illiteracy levels are high making it near impossible for consumers 
to understand the consequences of the terms on which they contract.  
Tackling the use of unfair commercial practices will require wider legislative reforms that are broadly 
drafted to accommodate technological innovation. A stated earlier, m-pesa’s success highlighted regulatory gaps 
which spurred legislative reforms in several areas, including its consumer protection frameworks. In 2012, the 
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Kenyan Consumer Protection Act was passed with one of its aims being to protect “consumers from all forms and 
means of unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices including deceptive, 
misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct”.206  Such regulatory intervention is necessary to protect consumers, 
especially those who may be more susceptible to certain unfair practices owing to reasons like age, illiteracy, 
mental disability and poverty. 
To ensure that regulators can understand and respond adequately to the different risks associated with 
innovation, they will need to step up their supervision and oversight capabilities.207 This will require that they 
work with participants in the ecosystem to understand the products being offered as well as the attendant risks. 
This approach ensures that regulators retain access to critical information in a fast-changing innovative 
marketplace which allows them to adjust their regulatory policies where required.208 In many cases, regulators 
will also need to work closely with legislative authorities to design appropriate legislative responses where 
necessary.   
 
CONCLUSION  
In developing countries with high mobile penetration rates, m-payments can assist in extending financial services 
to the unbanked populace. Consequently, the service has drawn the attention of regulators. While regulatory 
responses to innovation must be country-specific and tailored to suit local realities, policymakers seeking to 
leverage innovation for financial inclusion should learn from the experiences of other countries. Reflecting on 
Nigeria’s experience, the article concludes that while high mobile penetration rates are a strong indicator that m-
payments may flourish in a given jurisdiction, much depends on the regulatory environment for their successful 
take-off.  
More specifically, the article first argued that one reason for the dismal success of m-payments in Nigeria is the 
CBN’s initial decision to exclude MNOs from directly providing m-payments services.  Given their extensive 
agent networks, the paper argued that the direct participation of MNOs in m-payments is  crucial in driving efforts 
at improving inclusion. Recent regulatory changes support this view. Second, contrasting CBN and CBK’s 
approach to the early regulation of m-payments in their respective jurisdictions, the article highlights the 
importance of flexible regulatory approaches that encourage communication between regulators and innovators. 
Such approaches may better achieve the balance between protecting the financial system and leveraging 
innovation to drive inclusion. Third, while acknowledging policy shifts in Nigeria which allow MNOs to 
participate in the market through niche banking institutions, the paper highlights the difficulties associated with 
this approach by drawing on India’s experience.  
Fourth, the article suggests that if financial inclusion is a policy priority, regulators should embrace models 
that encourage investment by providers with good agent networks in underserved areas. Accordingly, it was 
argued that MNO-led models or hybrid models are more likely to record transformative success. Finally, the 
article proposes that a pragmatic approach to regulating innovation is one that seeks to understand and identify 
associated risks to enable regulators design proportionate responses.  
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